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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




At issue in this case is the interpretation of a Closing 
Agreement between the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") 
and appellant Bethlehem Steel Corporation ("Bethlehem" or 
"taxpayer") that preceded the payout by the IRS to 
Bethlehem of a refund of an anticipated overpayment of 
taxes, subject to later audit. Resolution of the issue 
depends on whether an anti-retroactivity clause in the 
agreement prevents the IRS from applying retroactive 
legislation, enacted after the parties' execution of the 
Closing Agreement, in determining Bethlehem's tax liability. 
The District Court held that the language of the clause 
limits its protection to "terms" of the agreement, and that 
the amount of the cash-out and the method by which it 
would be calculated were not "terms" of the agreement. The 
District Court therefore granted summary judgment to the 




Under the law applicable from 1976 to 1986, domestic 
manufacturers could claim tax credits based on certain 
modernization investments. If not fully used in the year 
earned, these credits could be "carried forward" for use in 
future years. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 ("TRA")1 repealed 
the investment credit for property placed in service after 
December 31, 1985, and reduced the value of unused 
credits. One of various transition rules enacted in 
conjunction with the repeal provided a tax benefit for 
qualified domestic steel manufacturers, such as Bethlehem, 
which were in dire financial straits and unlikely to generate 
sufficient income to use their remaining tax credits. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
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Under TRA S 212, the steel manufacturers could elect to 
treat 50% of their unused credits ("existing carryforwards") 
as an income tax payment for the first taxable year after 
December 31, 1986, thereby enabling them to "cash out" 
the credits through a "refund" for overpayment of taxes. 
Because this benefit was intended to enable the qualified 
companies to modernize their operations, S 212(f) required 
the companies to reinvest their refunds into their 
businesses, although the TRA did not set a reinvestment 
deadline. Moreover, while the statute's definition of 
"existing carryforwards" included 1986 credits, see TRA 
S 212(g)(2), the Conference Report on the statute clearly 
stated Congress' intent to include credits only through 
1985, see 2 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-841, at 65 (1986). The 
House of Representatives passed a bill in 1987 that would 
have retroactively amended S 212 to exclude 1986 credits, 
but the Senate never addressed that bill. 
 
Meanwhile, Bethlehem and other eligible steel companies 
(collectively, the "Steel Companies") anticipated large 1987 
refunds as a result of S 212. In February and March, 1988, 
a committee of the Steel Companies (including Bethlehem) 
met with the IRS to discuss how to obtain the refunds prior 
to the actual filing (and auditing) of their 1987 returns. It 
was not unusual for steel companies to obtain extensions 
for filing their tax returns because of the complexity of their 
business affairs. The Steel Companies wanted the IRS to 
issue the refunds on March 15, 1988, the statutory date of 
their "overpayments," and there is legislative history that 
Senators interested in the bill intended that the cash-outs 
be quickly released. See 132 Cong. Rec. S8269 (1986) 
(statements of Sens. Heinz and Packwood). The Steel 
Companies initially proposed that the agency process the 
refunds using an expedited procedure designed to adjust 
overpayment of estimated income taxes. The IRS rejected 
this proposal, negotiating to ensure that it had time to 
audit the refunds and that the Steel Companies complied 
with S 212's reinvestment mandate. In return for 
concessions in these areas, the IRS agreed to issue the 
refunds promptly upon receipt of the Steel Companies' 
claims. To memorialize the parties' agreement, the IRS 
drafted a "Closing Agreement on Final Determination 
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Covering Specific Matters" ("Closing Agreement") without 
significant input from the Steel Companies. 
 
On March 9 and 11, 1988, respectively, Bethlehem and 
the IRS signed the Closing Agreement. It provided: 
 
        WHEREAS, [Bethlehem ] anticipates an overpayment 
       of its federal income tax liability for its [1987] taxable 
       year . . . resulting from the application of [S] 212 of the 
       [TRA] and desires a quick release by the [IRS] of any 
       such overpayment; and 
 
        WHEREAS, [Bethlehem ] may be unable to file its 
       federal income tax return for [1987] . . . by its due date 
       determined without regard to any time to file extension. 
 
        NOW IT IS HEREBY DETERMINED AND AGREED for 
       federal income tax purposes that: 
 
       1) [Bethlehem ] agrees that the period of limitations 
       for the [IRS] to bring suit to recover any amount 
       of such overpayment claimed by [Bethlehem ] 
       that is determined to be erroneous or excessive 
       shall not expire prior to the expiration of the 
       period of limitations on assessment of tax . . . 
       with respect to [Bethlehem's] federal income tax 
       return for [1987] . . . . 
 
       2) [Bethlehem ] agrees that the amount determined 
       under [S] 212 of the [TRA] will be spent within 3 
       years of the date of the refund for reinvestment 
       in and modernization of its steel operations 
       through investment in modern plant and 
       equipment, research and development, and other 
       appropriate projects . . ., as required by [S] 212(f) 
       of the [TRA]. 
 
       3) The [IRS] agrees to effect a prompt release of any 
       refund due upon the filing by [Bethlehem ] of the 
       election and claim for the quick release of 
       refund. 
 
        WHEREAS, the determinations set forth above are 
       hereby agreed to by the [IRS], and by [Bethlehem ], 
       including its successors and assigns. 
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        NOW THIS CLOSING AGREEMENT WITNESSETH, 
       that [Bethlehem ] and [the IRS] hereby mutually agree 
       that the determinations set forth above shall be final 
       and conclusive, subject, however, to reopening in the 
       event of fraud, malfeasance, or misrepresentation of 
       material fact; furthermore, no change or modification of 
       applicable statutes will render this agreement ineffective 
       with respect to the terms agreed to herein. 
 
App. at 30-31 (emphasis added). It is conceded that the 
"anti-retroactivity" clause, underlined above,"was never an 
issue" in the IRS-Steel Companies meetings. App. at 126. 
 
The IRS also drafted, again without significant input from 
the Steel Companies, an "Election and Claim for Quick 
Release of Overpayment Resulting from the Application of 
Section 212 of the Tax Reform Act" of 1986 ("Claim Form"), 
which the Steel Companies were to use to request their 
refunds. App. at 36. The Claim Form referred to"the 
election required under [TRA S] 212," allowed the electing 
company to specify the percentage of "existing 
carryforwards as defined in [TRA S] 212(g)(2)" to which its 
election would apply, and required the company to list the 
carryforwards supporting its refund calculation. App. at 36- 
37. On March 15, 1988, Bethlehem filed its Claim Form, 
electing the S 212 cash-out, and claiming a $140,428,024 
refund based on $280,856,047 of existing carryforwards. It 
explicitly included its 1986 credits in its refund calculations 
which it attached to the form, as required. The IRS paid the 
claimed refund on March 25, 1988. 
 
Bethlehem filed its consolidated 1987 income tax return 
on August 8, 1988. On November 10, Congress enacted the 
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 
("TAMRA").2 TAMRA S 1002(f)(5) amended TRA S 212 to 
exclude 1986 credits from the definition of "existing 
carryforwards" used to calculate S 212 refunds, and 
S 1019(a) provided that this "amendment . .. shall take 
effect as if included in the provision of the Reform Act to 
which [it] relates." Consequently, upon its audit of 
Bethlehem's 1987 tax return, the IRS determined that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
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company's 1986 credits, worth $11,381,450, should not 
have been included in calculating the company'sS 212 
refund. The IRS and Bethlehem entered into an agreement 
whereby the company agreed to pay the resulting deficiency 
of $5,690,725 plus interest, for a total of $13,397,164, but 
reserved its right to claim a refund based on its purported 
right to include 1986 credits in its S 212 refund 
calculations. Bethlehem paid the assessment and sought 




On July 2, 1998, Bethlehem sued the IRS to recover the 
refund, arguing that the Agreement's anti-retroactivity 
clause barred the application of TAMRA to exclude 1986 
credits from the calculation of its S 212 refund. After 
submitting a stipulated record, the parties cross-moved for 
summary judgment. The District Court denied both 
motions, finding the Agreement ambiguous. After discovery, 
the parties again cross-moved for summary judgment. 
 
On August 7, 2000, the court granted the IRS's motion 
and denied Bethlehem's motion. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. 
v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 2d 449 (E.D. Pa. 2000). After 
considering extrinsic evidence, it found that the 
Agreement's overriding purpose was to expedite 
Bethlehem's receipt of its refund, and that the parties 
negotiated and agreed to provisions providing for: (1) 
prompt release of the refund, (2) an extension of the IRS's 
statute of limitations for challenging the refund, and (3) a 
deadline for Bethlehem's reinvestment of the refund. 
Finding that neither the amount nor the method of 
calculating the refund were negotiated terms of the 
Agreement, the court held that they were not protected by 
the Agreement's narrow anti-retroactivity clause. Bethlehem 
timely filed its notice of appeal. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1331, 1346(a)(1). This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1291, and conducts a plenary review of the 
District Court's summary judgment rulings. See Wheeler v. 
Towanda Area Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 





The IRS is authorized to enter into closing agreements 
which are "final and conclusive . . . except upon a showing 
of fraud or malfeasance, or misrepresentation of a material 
fact." 26 U.S.C. S 7121(b). Courts interpret closing 
agreements according to general federal contract law 
principles. See United States v. Nat'l Steel Corp., 75 F.3d 
1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1996); Rink v. Comm'r, 47 F.3d 168, 
171 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 
We determine a contract's meaning as a matter of law 
when its language is clear and unambiguous, see Int'l 
Union v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 138 (3d Cir. 
1999), but may use extrinsic evidence to clarify the 
meaning of an ambiguous contract. See In re New Valley 
Corp., 89 F.3d 143, 150 (3d Cir. 1996). We have stated that 
"[t]o decide whether a contract is ambiguous, we do not 
simply determine whether, from our point of view, the 
language is clear. . . . [W]e consider the contract language, 
the meanings suggested by counsel, and the extrinsic 
evidence offered in support of each interpretation. Extrinsic 
evidence may include the structure of the contract, the 
bargaining history, and the conduct of the parties that 
reflects their understanding of the contract's meaning." 
Teamsters Indus. Employees Welfare Fund v. Rolls-Royce 
Motor Cars, Inc., 989 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations 
omitted); see also In re New Valley Corp., 89 F.3d at 150. 
 
In its discussion of the Agreement, the District Court 
cited the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of an identical 
closing agreement between the IRS and another of the Steel 
Companies. See Bethlehem Steel Corp., 108 F. Supp.2d at 
453; Nat'l Steel, 75 F.3d at 1152. In National Steel, the 
court held that the purpose of the closing agreement was to 
expedite National Steel's receipt of its refund while 
protecting the IRS's interests. It further held that the anti- 
retroactivity clause protects only those terms decided in the 
agreement. Nat'l Steel, 75 F.3d at 1151. The court 
concluded that despite the document's references toS 212 
the agreement did not specify the use of the section's then- 
current refund-calculation criteria, noting that"[h]ad 
National Steel wanted to avoid the risk of a retroactive 
change in law, it could have negotiated for a determination 
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that its tax liability would be calculated in accordance with 
existing law." Id. at 1152. 
 
In this case, the parties do not dispute that the anti- 
retroactivity clause applies only to "terms" of the Agreement.3 
However, the IRS claims that because, as both the District 
Court and the Seventh Circuit found, the S 212 refund 
calculation is not a term of the Agreement, the clause does 
not bar application of TAMRA's retroactive exclusion of 
1986 credits from the calculation of Bethlehem's refund.4 
Bethlehem, on the other hand, contends that because this 
court considers extrinsic evidence in determining whether a 
contract is ambiguous, we should not follow the National 
Steel decision which was made without the benefit of such 
evidence. The company asserts that the evidence in this 
case proves that the parties intended that Bethlehem's 
refund be calculated under the existing S 212, thereby 
making the method of calculation a term of the Agreement. 
Any other interpretation, the company contends, renders 
the Agreement's anti-retroactivity clause meaningless. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Bethlehem does urge this court to give the anti-retroactivity clause 
special significance, asserting that the clause, which the IRS drafted 
unilaterally, varies from the agency's standard retroactivity language. 
See App. at 34 (Form 906, January 1987) ("This agreement is final and 
conclusive except: . . . if it relates to a tax period ending after the 
date 
of this agreement, it is subject to any law, enacted after the agreement 
date, that applies to that tax period."); see also 26 C.F.R. S 301.7121- 
1(c)(2) (2001) ("[A] closing agreement with respect to a taxable period 
ending subsequent to the date of the agreement is subject to any change 
in, or modification of, the law enacted subsequent to the date of the 
agreement and made applicable to such taxable period."); Rev. Proc. 68- 
16, 1968-1 C.B. 770, 796 (same). 
 
4. National Steel also found that the requirement that closing agreements 
have high-level IRS approval would be undermined if courts considered 
the testimony of IRS negotiators to alter the agreements' language, and 
thus held that courts "must strive more mightily than would otherwise 
be the case to make sense of [such] contract[s] without ordering a[n 
evidentiary] hearing." Nat'l Steel, 75 F.3d at 1150. The IRS urges this 
court to adopt the Seventh Circuit's determination that excessive 
consideration of extrinsic evidence in interpreting closing agreements 
may undermine the statutory requirement that closing agreements be 
approved by a high-level IRS authority. We need not reach this issue in 
light of our disposition. 
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We agree with the court in National Steel that the method 
of refund calculation is unambiguously not a term of the 
Agreement and is therefore not protected by the anti- 
retroactivity clause. Although we agree with the IRS that 
there is no ambiguity, even if we were to hold that there 
was, we would conclude that the extrinsic evidence of 
record reinforces this interpretation of the Agreement's 
plain language. 
 
A. The Refund-Calculation Method Is Not a Term 
       of the Agreement 
 
The Closing Agreement, which by its title is expressly 
limited to "[s]pecific [m]atters," App. at 30, contains only 
three substantive paragraphs describing terms agreed upon 
by the parties. Each of these provisions deals with 
procedures pertaining to Bethlehem's receipt and 
investment of its S 212 refund, and the IRS's release and 
auditing of the refund. None of the three purports to set an 
amount, or describe a calculation formula, for the refund, 
and these matters plainly do not constitute terms of the 
Agreement. Bethlehem cites the two references toS 212 in 
the Agreement as evidence that the section's then-current 
method of refund calculation, which included 1986 credits, 
is a term of the Agreement. However, neither of the 
references purports to describe the method to be used in 
calculating the refund.5 
 
One reference, in the Agreement's first recital, states that 
Bethlehem anticipates a tax overpayment in 1987 as a 
result of S 212 and desires a quick release of such 
overpayment. This recital explains the purpose of the 
agreement, rather than defining a term agreed upon by the 
parties. It focuses on the promptness of the IRS's response 
to Bethlehem's anticipated refund claim rather than the 
size or manner of calculating the refund. The reference to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The grammatical structure of the Closing Agreement certainly suggests 
that the IRS took no position in that Agreement as to the applicability of 
the method of calculation of the refund in S 212. Throughout the Closing 
Agreement it is Bethlehem, not the IRS, which is the subject of the 
clauses which reference S 212. The IRS retains a neutral position toward 
the availability of any recovery, let alone a specific amount or means of 
calculation. 
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S 212 merely acknowledges the statute precipitating the 
agreement and cannot reasonably be understood to provide 
for a particular method of calculating the refund. 
 
The IRS's guideline describing the proper form for closing 
agreements relating to specific matters states, in relevant 
part: 
 
       The identification of the parties is followed by one or 
       more WHEREAS clauses which serve to introduce the 
       subject matter of the agreement and state premises 
       upon which it is based. . . . 
 
       It is important to distinguish between matters which 
       are merely informative and explanatory and matters 
       which are being agreed upon. The former should be 
       segregated from the latter and should ordinarily be 
       reflected in the introductory recitals contained in the 
       WHEREAS clauses. 
 
Rev. Proc. 68-16, 1968-1 C.B. 770, 779.6  This guideline 
further supports our conclusion that the Agreement's first 
reference to S 212 does not incorporate the section's refund- 
calculation method into the contract as a matter"agreed 
upon" by the parties. 
 
The second reference is in the second substantive 
provision of the Agreement, which provides that Bethlehem 
must reinvest "the amount determined under"S 212 within 
three years of receiving the money. The company argues 
that this phrase specifies the method for calculating the 
reinvestment amount and, therefore, the refund amount. 
However, the phrase is situated in a provision describing 
the time and manner, rather than the amount, of 
reinvestment, belying this interpretation. Nonetheless, 
Bethlehem contends that the actual effect of the 
reinvestment deadline in this case supports its position, 
stating that because it respected the three-year deadline, it 
reinvested its entire refund before the IRS disallowed the 
portion of the refund based on 1986 credits, with the result 




6. The three substantive paragraphs of the Agreement are structured as 
described in this guideline. 
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Bethlehem argues that by imposing the three-year 
reinvestment deadline, the IRS bound itself to use the same 
method to calculate the refund as the company had used to 
calculate the reinvestment obligation. This "overinvestment" 
claim is not supported in the record and does not compel 
Bethlehem's interpretation of the Agreement. Bethlehem 
points to no evidence that it reinvested more under the 
Agreement than it otherwise planned to invest, or that it 
did so before TAMRA was enacted, less than one year into 
the reinvestment period. Moreover, Bethlehem undertook 
the risk of overinvestment when it agreed to extend the 
IRS's period of limitations for challenging the refund past 
the reinvestment deadline rather than negotiating for a 
different timeline. 
 
In fact, Bethlehem's overinvestment argument highlights 
the fact that the Agreement's first substantive provision 
expressly reserves the IRS's right to challenge the 
company's claimed refund should it be "determined to be 
erroneous or excessive" and extends the agency's statute of 
limitations for such challenges. App. at 30. Along with the 
final substantive provision, requiring prompt release of the 
claimed refund, this provision further demonstrates that 
the parties intended that the Agreement would facilitate 
Bethlehem's quick receipt of the funds while allowing the 
IRS ample time to audit the company's claim. It follows that 
there was no reason why the Agreement would contain any 
term detailing the anticipated refund's size or calculation. 
We therefore agree with the IRS that the Closing Agreement 
was not ambiguous and that it was entitled to summary 
judgment on its first motion. 
 
B. Extrinsic Evidence Reinforces the Agreement's 
       Unambiguous Meaning 
 
Even assuming, arguendo, that either the Agreement's 
references to S 212 or the extrinsic evidence create an 
ambiguity as to whether the parties meant to incorporate a 
refund-calculation formula into the Agreement, 
consideration of the extrinsic evidence submitted with the 
renewed motions for summary judgment supports our 
reading of the document's plain language. The record 
demonstrates clearly that the parties never discussed, 
much less negotiated, the method to be used for calculating 
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the refund. In fact, there is evidence that the Steel 
Companies, although aware of the discrepancy between the 
language of the existing statute regarding 1986 credits and 
the intent of Congress reflected in the Conference Report, 
anticipated that a second technical corrections bill would 
be introduced in 1988. However, as part of a deliberate 
strategy, they did not raise the issue of whether the 1986 
credits would be included in calculating their refunds 
during their negotiations with the IRS leading to the 
Closing Agreement. Donald McCambridge, Bethlehem's lead 
representative in the IRS-Steel Companies negotiations, 
later wrote: 
 
       As background material for the negotiations, we 
       provided the IRS with copies of both the statute and 
       the Conference Report. The IRS never raised a question 
       about the difference [regarding 1986 credits] and we 
       did not feel compelled to make a special effort to call it 
       to their attention. To this day I could not positively say 
       that the failure to raise the issue was due to ignorance 
       or acceptance of the fact that the statute is controlling. 
 
App. at 161 (Letter from McCambridge to Harshman of 
5/2/91). 
 
Bethlehem points out that the Steel Companies 
referenced their intent to include 1986 credits in their 
calculations in documents they gave the IRS, and notes 
that the IRS did not challenge their definition of"existing 
carryforwards." However, this does not show that the 
parties reached an accord on the method of refund 
calculation and agreed to make it a term of their limited 
Agreement. In fact, the references to the 1986 credits do 
not even demonstrate that the Steel Companies subjectively 
understood their method of refund calculation to be a term 
of the Agreement, particularly in light of their deliberate 
failure to address this issue during the negotiations leading 
up to the Agreement. As the court noted in National Steel, 
75 F.3d at 1152, had the Steel Companies wanted to avoid 
the risk that an amendment would exclude 1986 credits, 
they could have negotiated for an explicit term fixing the 
refund-calculation formula.7 Bethlehem cites authority for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. During such negotiations, the Steel Companies could also have 
bargained for an anti-retroactivity clause protecting the method-of- 
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the proposition that one contracting party is bound by the 
other's intent if the first party knows or should know of this 
intent. See, e.g., Sunbury Textile Mills, Inc. v. Comm'r, 585 
F.2d 1190, 1195 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing 3 A. Corbin, Corbin 
on Contracts S 543, at 140 (1960), and Emor, Inc. v. Cyprus 
Mines Corp., 467 F.2d 770, 775 (3d Cir. 1972)). But in this 
case, Bethlehem is not merely requesting that this court, 
like the courts in Sunbury and Emor, interpret an existing 
contract term according to the parties' subjective 
understanding of that term. Instead, it asks us to infer that 
the parties subjectively intended (or that the IRS knew that 
Bethlehem intended) the Agreement to include an 
additional term not discussed in the document's 
substantive provisions. There is no basis for us to conclude 
that the IRS knew that Bethlehem so intended. As for the 
Steel Companies, the evidence shows that at the time of 
their negotiations with the IRS, they were aware of the 
possibility of retroactive amendment in light of the 
discrepancy between the statutory language and the 
legislative intent regarding treatment of 1986 credits, but 
chose not to discuss it. 
 
Bethlehem contends that in addition to alerting the IRS 
to its intention to include the 1986 credits, the Claim Form 
prepared by the IRS incorporated this refund-calculation 
method into the Closing Agreement. The Claim Form was 
drafted by the IRS and signed and submitted by Bethlehem 
as part of the same series of negotiations between the IRS 
and the Steel Companies as the Agreement. Pursuant to the 
Agreement, Bethlehem's submission of the Claim Form 
triggered the IRS's prompt release of Bethlehem's refund. 
Therefore, Bethlehem contends that we must consider the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
calculation term. Bethlehem makes much of the fact that the Steel 
Companies did not negotiate for the anti-retroactivity clause, and that 
the IRS added it to the Closing Agreement unilaterally. Perhaps the 
companies' failure to bargain for an anti-retroactivity clause was part of 
their strategy not to call to the agency's attention the 1986-credit 
discrepancy and the possibility of future technical corrections bills. 
However, this failure now undermines Bethlehem's argument that the 
parties understood the Agreement to fix permanently a particular refund- 
calculation method. 
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Claim Form in interpreting the Agreement. See Williams v. 
Metzler, 132 F.3d 937, 947 (3d Cir. 1997) (" `A writing is 
interpreted as a whole, and all writings that are part of the 
same transaction are interpreted together.' ") (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 202(2) (1981)). Because 
the Claim Form refers to "existing carryforwards as defined 
in [TRA S] 212(g)(2)," App. at 36, the company asserts that 
consideration of the form demonstrates that the refund- 
calculation method was a term of the Agreement. 
 
Consideration of the Claim Form does not, however, alter 
our agreement with the District Court's finding that the 
Closing Agreement's overriding purpose was to delineate the 
timing and procedures for distributing the Steel Companies' 
claimed S 212 refunds promptly and did not address the 
substance of the refunds' amount or calculation. The 
Closing Agreement's requirement that the companies 
submit Claim Forms to trigger distribution of their claimed 
refunds comports with TRA S 212(a)'s requirement that 
each company affirmatively elect to cash out its 
carryforwards in order to receive such a refund. Moreover, 
the Claim Form was not signed by the IRS. The parties' 
decision to exclude the refund calculations from the body of 
their Agreement reinforces our understanding of this 
document as limited to the three enumerated terms 
expressly described therein. 
 
Bethlehem's remaining arguments, that the District 
Court's interpretation of the Agreement is inappropriate 
because it deprives Bethlehem of any benefit of the 
Agreement and renders the anti-retroactivity clause 
meaningless, see Arnold M. Diamond, Inc., 180 F.3d at 522 
(" `[A]n interpretation which gives a[n] . . . effective meaning 
to all the terms is preferred to [one] which leaves a part . . . 
of no effect.' ") (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
S 203 (1981)), are unavailing. The Agreement expedited 
Bethlehem's receipt of over $140 million.8  Although 
Bethlehem argues that this does not constitute a benefit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. McCambridge testified at his deposition that the Steel Companies' 
primary objective in their negotiations with the IRS was to accelerate the 
release of their claimed refunds, due to the time value of money. See 
App. at 93-94. 
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because Congress intended the IRS to effectuate a quick 
release of the S 212 refunds, the TRA did not specify a 
procedure or timeline for the refund. The Agreement did 
both, and there was no guarantee that the IRS would 
otherwise have released the money as promptly as it did in 
the absence of more specific legislative guidance. 9 The 
clause prevents the application of retroactive amendments 
affecting the express terms of the agreement, such as the 
statute of limitations for challenging the refund and the 
reinvestment deadline. The lack of such amendments in 




In conclusion, the Closing Agreement's substantive 
provisions discuss only the timeline for issuing, reinvesting, 
and challenging Bethlehem's S 212 refund, and the manner 
of reinvestment of the refund. The document never 
mentions the amount of the refund or the method for 
refund calculation. In light of the Agreement's self- 
consciously limited scope, its silence regarding these 
matters unambiguously demonstrates that they were 
simply not terms agreed upon by the parties. An 
examination of the extrinsic evidence of record confirms 
this interpretation of the Agreement's plain language. 
 
Therefore, we find as a matter of law that the 
Agreement's limited anti-retroactivity clause does not 
protect Bethlehem from the retroactive TAMRA exclusion of 
1986 credits from the S 212 refund calculation and we will 




9. For example, McCambridge's letter summarizing the Steel Companies' 
February 1988 meeting with the IRS stated that "[t]he first issue [the 
IRS] raised was that [it] did not think[it] had the authority to disburse 
funds without passage of the technical corrections bill because the 
specific refund procedure is contained only in the technical corrections 
bill, not in the original statute." App. at 77 (Letter from McCambridge to 
Arnett of 2/5/88); see also App. at 104 (McCambridge Deposition). 
 
10. In response to inquiry by this court, both parties agree that the 
recent filing by Bethlehem Steel for bankruptcy has no effect on this 
matter. 
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